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25,277 Posts
Discussion Starter #1

November 21, 2013

An internal memo within the Department of Justice (DOJ) has surfaced which confirms that the Obama administration had plans for gun registration and confiscation in the aftermath of the Newtown school shooting.

According to Bob Owens, the NRA obtained the memo in February. But apparently there were questions as to the veracity of the information. Owens says that the existence of the memo, and its outline of a plan for gun registration and confiscation, can now be confirmed.

The document, which can be viewed here, was not released to the public via the news media.

Owens cites an analysis of the memo, including direct quotes from the document, which exposes the Obama administration's real agenda on guns:

The DOJ memo states the administration “believes that a gun ban will not work without mandatory gun confiscation,” according to the NRA, and thinks universal background checks “won’t work without requiring national gun registration.” Obama has yet to publicly support national registration or firearms confiscation, although the memo reveals his administration is moving in that direction.

Thus, despite the many denials by Obama, by members of his administration, and by Congressional Democrats, once again it has become clear that the administration's true agenda is very different from that which is presented to the public.

The goal is and always has been gun registration and confiscation.

The Examiner has often reported the Obama agenda on guns, which can be traced all the way back to his years in the Illinois legislature. He was considered among the most aggressive anti-gun advocates in Illinois.

Obama voted to criminalize any homeowner who used an illegal firearm to defend himself and/or his family in the event of a home invasion by dangerous criminals.

The philosophy that underlies such a point of view is clear. To Obama it is more important that a gun be "legal" than for human lives to be saved. This stance portrays a shocking disregard for the sanctity of human life.

Thus, many conservatives warned as far back as 2007 that an Obama candidacy for the presidency would be a very dangerous turn for America. Obama would never tell the public just how radical he is. To do so would end his political career.

This is why Obama denied repeatedly that he had been close friends with murderous homegrown terrorists such as Bill Ayers and his wife, Bernadine Dohrn. The couple bombed federal buildings, encouraged teenagers to murder their parents, and were arrested for the murder of a police officer but were released on a technicality.

It turns out that Ayers launched Obama's political career in his living room -- all confirmed as fact. Birds of a feather. And the Obama agenda reflects it.

But like so many other components of the Obama agenda, the public only finds out the real truth once the program is actually implemented. It is only then that it becomes clear that the emperor has no clothes. Only then it is too late.

Fortunately for the populace, enough conservatives, libertarians, and other freedom-loving citizens were on to the Obama gun ban agenda long before it became an issue. Nationally his agenda was thus thwarted. But astute citizens are certain that this is not the end of it.

The forces of tyranny never give up.

Premium Member
18,760 Posts
I watched him the other day on FOX, right after Reid's vote on the 'Nuclear Option', and the way he talked, and his mannerisms reminded me of a fanatic. Then he ends the whole deal by saying-'So and so will answer your questions', and walks off like he had tee off time. Arrogance at its finest.

25,277 Posts
Discussion Starter #3
Summary of Select Firearm Violence

Prevention Strategies

Greg Ridgeway, Ph.D.

Deputy Director

National Institute of Justice

January 4, 2013

On average there are about 11,000 firearm homicides every year. While there are deaths resulting from
accidental discharges and suicides, this document will focus on intentional firearm homicides.

from mass shootings (those with 4 or more victim
s in a particular place and time) account on average for
35 fatalities per year. Policies that address the larger firearm homicide issue will have a far greater
impact even if they do not address the particular issues of mass shootings.
This document provi
des a cursory summary of select initiatives to reduce firearm violence and an
assessment of the evidence for the initiative.

Gun buybacks

Twitter summary: Buybacks are ineffective unless massive and coupled with a ban

Goal: Reduce access to firearms by inc
entivizing owners to dispose of their unwanted guns rather than
transfer them to a more risky possessor

Gun buybacks are ineffective as generally implemented

1. The buybacks are too small to have
an impact.

2. The guns turned in are at low risk
of ever being used in a crime.

3. Replacement guns are
easily acquired. Unless these three points are overcome, a gun buyback cannot be effective.

The 1997 Australia gun buyback and its associated regulations is an exception to this.

1. It was large,
g back 20% of the firearm stock.

2. It targeted semi
automatic weapons.

3. It coupled the buyback
with a ban on certain weapons and a nationwide registration and licensing program. There is strong
evidence that it reduced mass killings (before the initiati
ve massacres occurred on average once per
year and none have occurred in the 15 years since).

The Australia buyback appears to have had no effect on crime otherwise. One
(Leigh & Neill 201
0) has proven confusing in that its abstract suggests that Australia’s gun buyback reduced firearm homicide
rates by 80%, but the body of the report finds no effect.

r & Mouzas 2003) have used the
same data and also found no effect on crime although they also noted that mass shootings appear to
have disappeared in Australia.

A third
(Chapman et al
2006) using Australian data from 1979 to
2003 shows that the firearm homicide rate was already declining prior to the firearm reforms and that
there is no evidence that the new legislation accelerated the declines. This remains true when data
through 2007
are added to the analysis (conducted by G. Ridgeway on 1/3/2013 at NIJ).

Large capacity magazines restrictions

Twitter summary: Great potential to reduce lethality; requires a massive reduction in supply

Goal: Reduce the lethality of guns by reducing the
number of rounds that can be quickly fired.

Restrictions on
the manufacture, sale, transfer, and possession of large capacity magazines
(usually defined as holding more t
han 10 rounds).

Mass shootings predominantly involve the use of la
rge capacity magazines. The most lethal
ones all involve large capacity magazines. In addition large capacity magazines were used in nearly 25%
of all crimes
in 1993 just
prior to the ban. There is reason to believe that reducing the availability of
capacity magazines could have an effect on the total number of homicides.

In five cities
closely found no change in the criminal use of large capacity magazines during the
ten year

However, a
Washington Post analysis
for Virginia continued the analysis where the
research team left off. The data indicate that the percentage of crime guns using large capacity
magazines declined from
18% in
1999 (when magazine imports were highest) to its lowest level in 2004
(10% of cri
me guns had large capacity magazines). The percentage doubled between 2004, when the
ban expired, and 2010.
The 1994 ban on large capacity magazines
had limited

Large capacity clips are a
durable good

There were an estimated 25
million guns with large capacity magazines in 1995

1994 law exempted magazines manufactured before 1994 so that the i
mportation of large capacity
magazines manufactured overseas before
1994 continued through the ban

4) while the price of the clips
ncreased dramatically (
80% during the ban
) they were not unaffordable

A 2004
of the 1994 law
found: “b
ecause the ban has not yet reduced the use of
[large capacity magazines
in cri
me, we cannot
clearly credit the ban with any of the nation’s recent drop in gun violence.

The 1994 ban essentially did
little to affect the supply of large capacity magazines.

In order to have an impact, large capacity magazine regulation needs to sharpl
y curtail their availability
to include restrictions on importation, manufacture, sale, and possession. An exemption for previously
owned magazines would nearly eliminate any impact. The program would need to be coupled with an
extensive buyback of existin
g large capacity magazines. With an exemption the impact of the restrictions
would only be felt when the magazines degrade or when the
y no longer are compatible with
guns in
circulation. This
would take decades to realize

Ammunition logs

summary: Increases opportunities to detect illegal firearm possessors


Reduce flow of ammunition to the illicit market

develop leads for illegal weapons.

Laws that prohibit certain individuals from owning firearms also pertain to am
USC 922g&n)

retail sales of firearms to criminals are regularly disrupted by instant
background checks, sales of ammunition are essentially unchecked

Ammunition purchase logs are a
means of checking for illegal purchases and
for developing intelligence on illegal firearms.

states do not
purchases, but rather require the purchaser to show a permit
to purchase ammunition and only of the
same caliber or gauge as
their firearm.

While purchasing a
arm is a one time action, repeated purchases of ammunition create more complications for
prohibited firearm possessors.

Evidence: A
used criminal background checks conducted on individuals p
urchasing ammunition in
Los Angeles in April and May 2004.

2.6% of transactions involved prohibited purchasers. They
rounds of ammunition
per month during this period

Rather than institute instant checks on
ammunition purchases, local poli
ce began regularly checking the logs for illegal purchases, using it as an
intelligence tool to find not only ammunition but also the illegally possessed weapons. Sacramento
instituted a similar program and identified 13 illegal purchasers per month in the
first year, recovering
an average of 7 illegal firearms per month.

There is evidence that the program can be used to identify prohibited purchasers and can aid in the
recovery of illegal firearms. The volume of recoveries is not of a scale likely to impac
t the illegal firearm
trade, but could disrupt some criminal activity.

In 2009 California passed AB 962 that would make the ammunition logs statewide. It has since been held
up in court due primarily to the use of the phrase “handgun ammunition,” which is
not a well

Universal background checks

Twitter summary:
Effectiveness depends on
the ability to reduce straw purchasing,
requiring gun
and an easy gun transfer process

To understand the value of background checks it is essent
ial to understand the source of crime guns.

Several sporadic attempts have been made to learn how criminals acquire guns. For example, a 2000
study by the ATF found the following distribution of sources

Source Percentage<br>
Straw purchase 47%<br>
Stolen 26%<br>
.Store 14%<br>
.Residence 10%<br>
.Common carrier 2%<br>
Unregulated private seller 20%<br>
Gun shows/flea markets 13%<br>
Retail diversion 8%<br>

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% since some sources fall into multiple
categories (e.g. unregulated seller at a
flea market)

These figures indicate informal transfers dominate the crime gun market. A
background check system can address the gun shows and
deter many unregulated private sellers.

However, this
does not address the largest sources
(straw purchasers and theft)
, which would most
likely become larger if background checks at gun shows and private sellers were addressed.

secondary market
the primary source of crime guns.

Ludwig and Cook (2000)
compared states that
introduced Brady checks to those states that already had background checks and found no effect of the
new background checks. They hypothesized that the background checks simply shifted
to the seconda
market those offenders who normally purchased in the primary market.
Supply sources can vary in different parts of the country. An NIJ funded
of the Los Angeles illicit
gun market
noted: “Results showed that many crime guns were first purchased at local

that is, in

licensed dealers, rather than from out of state. That is,
contrary to the conventional wisdom
that crime guns were being trafficked across state borders from plac
es with less stringent regulations,
such as Arizona and Nevada, we found that a majority of the guns used in crimes were purchased in Los
Angeles County.” Thus
, gun markets can be highly local.

Understanding gun sources requires a sustained and localized s
urveillance program. For example, the
program could interview new arrestees at intake about how they acquired their gun, cost, and general
gun availability. This could be conducted in conjunction with BJA’s plans to target local violence
prevention program
s in 20 cities. This is similar to the ADAM program for monitoring drug markets and
could, in fact, complement any restart of ADAM.

In the coming years such data could become available
through BJS efforts; BJS will include a series of questions in its 2013
/2014 national inmate survey.

25,277 Posts
Discussion Starter #4
In other words, bans, confiscation, registration, no private transfers, and government-permission-to-buy ID.

227 Posts
Brian, the NIJ is the research arm of the DOJ. If research on options requested,

you would expect a report. That does not imply that any or all of those options

are being considered for legislation.

Steve Schwab

25,277 Posts
Discussion Starter #6
LOL, it shows someone is asking the questions.

I expect a report showing how many criminals have actually been prosecuted for attempted gun purchases. Oh wait, we already know, there are barely any. The anti's only care about banning the guns of law-abiding citizens.

12,389 Posts
What part of Obo to Shara Brady, "under the radar", do people who claim to own firearms, don't understand??

Its not rocket science.
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